Thursday, 25 June 2015
Monday, 4 May 2015
Nice logic puzzle
Just came across it now. Nice brain teaser.
Looks like Einstein said that only 2% could solve it. Apparently he has made this up as a small kid. Who knew?
puzzle
I got to the answer.
Looks like Einstein said that only 2% could solve it. Apparently he has made this up as a small kid. Who knew?
puzzle
I got to the answer.
Friday, 17 April 2015
Wednesday, 8 April 2015
Russia and its ME conundrum
Succinct and nice post from Starfor. Engages in the dynamics of the various possibilities that lie ahead.
Link here
Russia tried its best to keep the Americans and Iranians apart. Offers to sell Iran advanced air defense systems were designed to poke holes in U.S. threats to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Teams of Russian nuclear experts whetted Iran’s appetite for civilian nuclear power with offers to build additional power reactors. Russian banks did their part to help Iran circumvent financial sanctions. The Russian plan all along was not to help Iran get the bomb, but to use its leverage with a thorny player in the Middle East to get the United States into a negotiation on issues vital to Russia’s national security interests. So, if Washington wanted to resolve its Iran problem, it would have to pull back on issues like ballistic missile defense in Central Europe, which Moscow saw early on as the first of several U.S. steps to encircle Russia.
Link here
Russia tried its best to keep the Americans and Iranians apart. Offers to sell Iran advanced air defense systems were designed to poke holes in U.S. threats to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Teams of Russian nuclear experts whetted Iran’s appetite for civilian nuclear power with offers to build additional power reactors. Russian banks did their part to help Iran circumvent financial sanctions. The Russian plan all along was not to help Iran get the bomb, but to use its leverage with a thorny player in the Middle East to get the United States into a negotiation on issues vital to Russia’s national security interests. So, if Washington wanted to resolve its Iran problem, it would have to pull back on issues like ballistic missile defense in Central Europe, which Moscow saw early on as the first of several U.S. steps to encircle Russia.
Friday, 3 April 2015
Strategic obeservations on Yemen
Now that the fight has moved towards Yemen, its time to begin a new topic and entry on Yemen.
Interesting reads:
This is perhaps the best I have seen so far: CSMonitory - Linking Houthis as Iranian Proxies is a mistake
FTA: "The Yemeni civil war is driven mostly by domestic competition for power and resources in a country that has one of the most heavily-armed citizenries in the world and whose entire post-colonial history has been marked by conflict. The civil war that broke out in 1962 – in which both Egypt and Saudi Arabia were major players – ended in 1967 with the country divided in two."
... There does not exist a natural affinity between the Yemeni Zeidis and the 12er [i.e. follower of the 12th imam] Shia of southern Iraq and Iran. The zaidiya follows a system of religious law (sharia) that more closely resembles that of the Hanafi Sunni "school" of law than that of the Shia of Iran or Iraq. The Zaidi scholars profess no allegiance to the 12er Shia scholarship of the Iranian teachers... In short there is little religious connection with Iran. For a Zaydi to "convert" to 12er Shiism is as big and alienating a step as "conversion" to Sunnism. Such a change would normally lead to family, clan and tribal ostracism.
More links:
Sic Semper Tyrannis Col Lang
"
There are certain peoples who are instinctively good at fighting. The Pushtuns, Somalis, Sikhs and Yemeni Zaidi tribesmen are among them. Others are not so good at fighting or joyful at the prospect of combat; Saudi hirelings of the Al-Saud "country" of Saudi Arabia, Egyptian peasant conscripts, and Sunni Yemenis of the south.
The Zaidi mountain tribesmen defeated the Egyptian Army fifty years ago. There is a large Egyptian military cemetery in San'a. The road down from the mountains to the port of Hodeida is still littered with destroyed Egyptian Army vehicles that were "killed" in guerrilla ambushes.
In the Yemen civil war of the 1960s the Saudi allies of the Yemeni monarchy carefully limited themselves to providing money, materiel and sanctuary in KSA while the Zaidi tribesmen fought a long, long, protracted guerrilla war against the Egyptians and the Sunni Republican Yemenis of the south.
"
"
The zaidiya, the form of Islam followed by these tribesmen, is a "legacy religion." It is the oldest and most traditionally minded of the various Shia sects. It is practiced only by the north Yemen mountaineers in their isolated villages and towns high on ridgelines and crests where a dispute often leads to a part of the village moving to another mountain. There are mosques in cities but this is alien ground for the mountaineers.
The zaidiyah is named for Zayd, the fifth Shia Imam. For that reason the Zaidis (or Zeidis) are often referred to as Fivers as opposed to Ismaili Shia Seveners (loyal to the memory of the seventh Imam) or Imami Twelver Shia (loyal to the 12th Imam). These different groups of Shia are NOT interchangeable in their membership and indeed are competitive in their claims as to which was the last worthy imam.
There does not exist a natural affinity between the Yemeni Zeidis and the 12er Shia of southern Iraq and Iran. The zaidiya follows a system of religious law (sharia) that more closely resembles that of the Hanafi Sunni "school" of law than that of the Shia of Iran or Iraq. The Zaidi scholars profess no allegiance to the 12er Shia scholarship of the Iranian teachers. In theology the Zaidis follow the methodology in analysis of the mu'tazila , the "rationalist" school of theology exterminated in the rest of Islam (including Iran) 1200 years ago. This system of scloarship survives only among the Zaydis. In short there is little religious connection with Iran. For a Zaydi to "convert" to 12er Shiism is as big and alienating a step as "conversion" to Sunnism. Such a change would normally lead to family, clan and tribal ostracism."
MERIP Notes
"This notion is flat-out wrong. Zaydism is related to the dominant Twelver form of Shi‘i Islam institutionalized in Iran in the same way that, say, Greek Orthodoxy is an offshoot of Catholicism -- the statement makes sense, maybe, in schismatic terms, but in terms of doctrine, practice, politics and even religious holidays Zaydism and Twelver Shi‘ism are quite distinct. Moreover, historically, the city of Sanaa and all points north were the Zaydi heartland. Resistance to the Houthi advance did not come from “Sunni tribesmen,” as so many reporters suggest, but from sons of Zaydi tribesmen who, when they joined the neo-conservative Islah, adopted or converted to a “Sunni” identity inspired by Saudi Wahhabism and/or the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers. The al-Ahmar clan, paramount sheikhs of the historically Zaydi Hashid tribal confederation clustered between Sa‘ada and Sanaa, and who detest the Houthis, are Zaydi by parentage and Sunni by denominational conversion via partisan affiliation with Islah. On the other side, the majority denomination in the coastal and southern midlands provinces are the Shafi‘is, who are Sunni (in the same way that Lutherans or Methodists are Protestant), but rarely identify themselves as such -- even if historically they distinguished themselves from the Zaydi regimes in Sanaa. Instead, to the limited extent that this conflict is “sectarian,” it is also institutional: It began with a rivalry between Houthi summer camps and the Saudi-financed salafi institute in the small, historically Zaydi town of Dammaj, which is a story rather more precise and interlaced with contemporary state power than the implied frame of “age-old” dispute between the two main branches of Islam allows. [2]
The second prevalent narrative, advanced from overseas by “brinkologists,” takes the Houthi advance as fresh evidence of Yemen’s imminent collapse. After forecasting state failure for more than a decade, this line of analysis has focused on micro-events, starting with the late October resignation of Prime Minister Muhammad Basindawa’s government and his technocratic successor Khalid Bahhah’s difficulties putting together a viable coalition. The corollary to brinkology is transitology, confidence in international experts’ ability to engineer transitions from authoritarianism to stable liberal democracy (as in Iraq). In this case the transitologists put great stock in, and were hired as expert consultants by, the so-called GCC initiative to stabilize Yemeni politics. The narrative that emerged went something like this: Yemen is on the verge of disintegration, but the GCC monarchies and Western advisers can save it from itself."
Mmh. More later. First time to digest the points. Ruminate and spit out wisdom.
Interesting reads:
This is perhaps the best I have seen so far: CSMonitory - Linking Houthis as Iranian Proxies is a mistake
FTA: "The Yemeni civil war is driven mostly by domestic competition for power and resources in a country that has one of the most heavily-armed citizenries in the world and whose entire post-colonial history has been marked by conflict. The civil war that broke out in 1962 – in which both Egypt and Saudi Arabia were major players – ended in 1967 with the country divided in two."
... There does not exist a natural affinity between the Yemeni Zeidis and the 12er [i.e. follower of the 12th imam] Shia of southern Iraq and Iran. The zaidiya follows a system of religious law (sharia) that more closely resembles that of the Hanafi Sunni "school" of law than that of the Shia of Iran or Iraq. The Zaidi scholars profess no allegiance to the 12er Shia scholarship of the Iranian teachers... In short there is little religious connection with Iran. For a Zaydi to "convert" to 12er Shiism is as big and alienating a step as "conversion" to Sunnism. Such a change would normally lead to family, clan and tribal ostracism.
More links:
Sic Semper Tyrannis Col Lang
"
There are certain peoples who are instinctively good at fighting. The Pushtuns, Somalis, Sikhs and Yemeni Zaidi tribesmen are among them. Others are not so good at fighting or joyful at the prospect of combat; Saudi hirelings of the Al-Saud "country" of Saudi Arabia, Egyptian peasant conscripts, and Sunni Yemenis of the south.
The Zaidi mountain tribesmen defeated the Egyptian Army fifty years ago. There is a large Egyptian military cemetery in San'a. The road down from the mountains to the port of Hodeida is still littered with destroyed Egyptian Army vehicles that were "killed" in guerrilla ambushes.
In the Yemen civil war of the 1960s the Saudi allies of the Yemeni monarchy carefully limited themselves to providing money, materiel and sanctuary in KSA while the Zaidi tribesmen fought a long, long, protracted guerrilla war against the Egyptians and the Sunni Republican Yemenis of the south.
"
"
The zaidiya, the form of Islam followed by these tribesmen, is a "legacy religion." It is the oldest and most traditionally minded of the various Shia sects. It is practiced only by the north Yemen mountaineers in their isolated villages and towns high on ridgelines and crests where a dispute often leads to a part of the village moving to another mountain. There are mosques in cities but this is alien ground for the mountaineers.
The zaidiyah is named for Zayd, the fifth Shia Imam. For that reason the Zaidis (or Zeidis) are often referred to as Fivers as opposed to Ismaili Shia Seveners (loyal to the memory of the seventh Imam) or Imami Twelver Shia (loyal to the 12th Imam). These different groups of Shia are NOT interchangeable in their membership and indeed are competitive in their claims as to which was the last worthy imam.
There does not exist a natural affinity between the Yemeni Zeidis and the 12er Shia of southern Iraq and Iran. The zaidiya follows a system of religious law (sharia) that more closely resembles that of the Hanafi Sunni "school" of law than that of the Shia of Iran or Iraq. The Zaidi scholars profess no allegiance to the 12er Shia scholarship of the Iranian teachers. In theology the Zaidis follow the methodology in analysis of the mu'tazila , the "rationalist" school of theology exterminated in the rest of Islam (including Iran) 1200 years ago. This system of scloarship survives only among the Zaydis. In short there is little religious connection with Iran. For a Zaydi to "convert" to 12er Shiism is as big and alienating a step as "conversion" to Sunnism. Such a change would normally lead to family, clan and tribal ostracism."
MERIP Notes
"This notion is flat-out wrong. Zaydism is related to the dominant Twelver form of Shi‘i Islam institutionalized in Iran in the same way that, say, Greek Orthodoxy is an offshoot of Catholicism -- the statement makes sense, maybe, in schismatic terms, but in terms of doctrine, practice, politics and even religious holidays Zaydism and Twelver Shi‘ism are quite distinct. Moreover, historically, the city of Sanaa and all points north were the Zaydi heartland. Resistance to the Houthi advance did not come from “Sunni tribesmen,” as so many reporters suggest, but from sons of Zaydi tribesmen who, when they joined the neo-conservative Islah, adopted or converted to a “Sunni” identity inspired by Saudi Wahhabism and/or the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers. The al-Ahmar clan, paramount sheikhs of the historically Zaydi Hashid tribal confederation clustered between Sa‘ada and Sanaa, and who detest the Houthis, are Zaydi by parentage and Sunni by denominational conversion via partisan affiliation with Islah. On the other side, the majority denomination in the coastal and southern midlands provinces are the Shafi‘is, who are Sunni (in the same way that Lutherans or Methodists are Protestant), but rarely identify themselves as such -- even if historically they distinguished themselves from the Zaydi regimes in Sanaa. Instead, to the limited extent that this conflict is “sectarian,” it is also institutional: It began with a rivalry between Houthi summer camps and the Saudi-financed salafi institute in the small, historically Zaydi town of Dammaj, which is a story rather more precise and interlaced with contemporary state power than the implied frame of “age-old” dispute between the two main branches of Islam allows. [2]
The second prevalent narrative, advanced from overseas by “brinkologists,” takes the Houthi advance as fresh evidence of Yemen’s imminent collapse. After forecasting state failure for more than a decade, this line of analysis has focused on micro-events, starting with the late October resignation of Prime Minister Muhammad Basindawa’s government and his technocratic successor Khalid Bahhah’s difficulties putting together a viable coalition. The corollary to brinkology is transitology, confidence in international experts’ ability to engineer transitions from authoritarianism to stable liberal democracy (as in Iraq). In this case the transitologists put great stock in, and were hired as expert consultants by, the so-called GCC initiative to stabilize Yemeni politics. The narrative that emerged went something like this: Yemen is on the verge of disintegration, but the GCC monarchies and Western advisers can save it from itself."
Mmh. More later. First time to digest the points. Ruminate and spit out wisdom.
Wednesday, 25 March 2015
Team of rivals
Very interesting point. Worth following and keeping in mind.
"
After his 1860 election, Lincoln realized with inspired humility and wisdom that he needed to include his well-experienced political rivals in his cabinet. A divided Union needed a government of unity. He invited his campaign opponents to serve a cause larger than their ambitions.
“These were the very strongest men,” Lincoln told a journalist. “Then I had no right to deprive the country of their services.”
Lincoln still provides key lessons for today’s fractured governments in need of a “team of rivals.” He knew how to share credit and accept blame. He listened hard and welcomed dissent without retaliation. He could navigate negative emotions and rise above criticism by keeping his clarity of vision and his sense of humor. He could be contrite and confident for the sake of something bigger than himself.
"
From Link
"
After his 1860 election, Lincoln realized with inspired humility and wisdom that he needed to include his well-experienced political rivals in his cabinet. A divided Union needed a government of unity. He invited his campaign opponents to serve a cause larger than their ambitions.
“These were the very strongest men,” Lincoln told a journalist. “Then I had no right to deprive the country of their services.”
Lincoln still provides key lessons for today’s fractured governments in need of a “team of rivals.” He knew how to share credit and accept blame. He listened hard and welcomed dissent without retaliation. He could navigate negative emotions and rise above criticism by keeping his clarity of vision and his sense of humor. He could be contrite and confident for the sake of something bigger than himself.
"
From Link
Monday, 23 February 2015
Thoughts to tickle the sense and mull over
The funny thing that life is.
Why is it that we feel the need to talk to a person the most when we push the relationship into the oblivion and then hope for a better outcome. Why don't we strive to improve the relationship earlier?
Why is it that we feel the use for a thing the most, once its broken. We abused it a fair bit and hence it broke. Why don't we think of the utility earlier?
Why is it that the guy at the top, the one who can afford to give in more and trust a little bit more, expect that the guys at the bottom should be more trust worthy and also work towards 'earning' the trust of their 'bosses'?
In reality, the guy at the bottom has a lot more to lose, by any measure, because the relationship is tilted in almost absolute favor of the company and the superior management... and still the bottom level isn't being trusted enough. And when the bottom level hits back, the bosses wonder "why? how? what? How is it possible that the bottom of the totem pole can launch such an assault against the superiors?" That said, why is it that the guys at the top aren't being a bit more flexible and a bit more trusting. Trust works both ways.
Why is it that when people say NO ,there are no negotiable options at all. Its just a NO without answers or reasons.
Its an unfair world. Its a world where issues aren't analysed, debated and discussed. But decisions are done, nevertheless. But we, as people, are judged. Rightly or wrongly.
Silly, stupid, senseless. This is absolute depravation. Is this also the sign of regression in mankind?
Why did all this happen?
Why is it that we feel the need to talk to a person the most when we push the relationship into the oblivion and then hope for a better outcome. Why don't we strive to improve the relationship earlier?
Why is it that we feel the use for a thing the most, once its broken. We abused it a fair bit and hence it broke. Why don't we think of the utility earlier?
Why is it that the guy at the top, the one who can afford to give in more and trust a little bit more, expect that the guys at the bottom should be more trust worthy and also work towards 'earning' the trust of their 'bosses'?
In reality, the guy at the bottom has a lot more to lose, by any measure, because the relationship is tilted in almost absolute favor of the company and the superior management... and still the bottom level isn't being trusted enough. And when the bottom level hits back, the bosses wonder "why? how? what? How is it possible that the bottom of the totem pole can launch such an assault against the superiors?" That said, why is it that the guys at the top aren't being a bit more flexible and a bit more trusting. Trust works both ways.
Why is it that when people say NO ,there are no negotiable options at all. Its just a NO without answers or reasons.
Its an unfair world. Its a world where issues aren't analysed, debated and discussed. But decisions are done, nevertheless. But we, as people, are judged. Rightly or wrongly.
Silly, stupid, senseless. This is absolute depravation. Is this also the sign of regression in mankind?
Why did all this happen?
Wednesday, 18 February 2015
RE overtakes Harleys
Yaah. Should have happened sometime eventually. Has a bigger base of people and a far better vehicle too.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/saritharai/2015/02/18/indias-vintage-royal-enfield-overtakes-harley-davidson-by-motorcycle-sales/
Interesting!
"Royal Enfield sold just over 300,000 units in 2014 to Harley-Davidson’s 2,67,999. To be sure, the American motorcycles are more expensive (twice the price of the top-end Royal Enfield) and popular brands of motorcycles sell in staggering numbers in populous India. But then as recently as in 2013, Harley-Davidson dominated sales selling 100,000 more motorcycles than Royal Enfield."
http://www.forbes.com/sites/saritharai/2015/02/18/indias-vintage-royal-enfield-overtakes-harley-davidson-by-motorcycle-sales/
Interesting!
"Royal Enfield sold just over 300,000 units in 2014 to Harley-Davidson’s 2,67,999. To be sure, the American motorcycles are more expensive (twice the price of the top-end Royal Enfield) and popular brands of motorcycles sell in staggering numbers in populous India. But then as recently as in 2013, Harley-Davidson dominated sales selling 100,000 more motorcycles than Royal Enfield."
Saturday, 14 February 2015
A full circle
I've heard of people say that life comes a full circle.
They got it wrong, we keep running around in circles without realizing it.
They got it wrong, we keep running around in circles without realizing it.
Monday, 19 January 2015
Arab exceptionalism in the 21st century
good read.
"
Today in East and South Asia the humiliation is over. One can be proud to be Chinese or Indian, not simply because of the glories of the past, but because of the accomplishments of today and the expectations of further progress tomorrow. The Arab, in contrast, can bask in the glories of the past, but can draw no sense of pride from the conditions of the present; and prospects for the future, as things stand in 2015, seem bleak.
Sources of terrorism arise in significant part from frustration. This sense of frustration has spread from the Arab world to other parts of the Ummah, notably in Central Asia and Africa: the recent terrorist attacks in Paris were perpetrated by French Arab Islamists, the London bombings ten years ago were the work of British Islamists of Pakistani origin."
More here
---
I have been seeing a lot of graphs and other evidence of how much the Indian / Harappan civvy was in terms of world GDP and it was almost 35+%.
"
Today in East and South Asia the humiliation is over. One can be proud to be Chinese or Indian, not simply because of the glories of the past, but because of the accomplishments of today and the expectations of further progress tomorrow. The Arab, in contrast, can bask in the glories of the past, but can draw no sense of pride from the conditions of the present; and prospects for the future, as things stand in 2015, seem bleak.
Sources of terrorism arise in significant part from frustration. This sense of frustration has spread from the Arab world to other parts of the Ummah, notably in Central Asia and Africa: the recent terrorist attacks in Paris were perpetrated by French Arab Islamists, the London bombings ten years ago were the work of British Islamists of Pakistani origin."
More here
---
I have been seeing a lot of graphs and other evidence of how much the Indian / Harappan civvy was in terms of world GDP and it was almost 35+%.
Tuesday, 13 January 2015
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